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The Roman historian Pliny recounts a story that ocurred during 
Periclean Athens. I will utilize this story, as a trope to undertake 
an interrogation of perception as it is commonly understood and 
currently practiced by art educators in schools. In order to deconstruct 
vision/blindness, or the perception/non-perception binary, I have 
examined the psychoanalytic paradigm of Jacques Lacan. His current 
interpreters provided the conceptual tools for such an undertaking. 
Given that the question of representation has become a key sign-post 
of postmodernism, art educators must conceptualize a trajectory for 
itself in the 21st century.
Part One of such a trajectory questions the very foundations of the 
Western Eye. Its heyday of Cartesian perspectivism has now evolved 
into the postmodern simulacrum which purports to represent the 
phantasmagoric spectacle, that Jean Baudrillard called the “hyperreal” 
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world of simulations where the sign of the image refers only to itself in a 
system of differences. Perception has been metaphorically characterized 
as a “corridor of mirrors, ” a mise en abyme  effect of endless reflection 
(Carroll, 1987). The claims to a multi-dimensional and multi-perspectival 
knowledge of all phenomenon paradoxically strengthens the status 
of an enucleated eye despite the waning of a transcendental gaze. In 
Part One, I question the validity of the enucleated eye  by raising the 
“spectre” of desire which can’t be “seen.” I suggest that this “other” 
of vision is introduced into the field of vision by the function of the 
gaze as Lacan developed it in his XI Seminar (1979). He argued that the 
field of vision is essentially organized around what cannot be seen and 
what appears as a “screen” or a “stain,” a “spot.” Given such a stance, 
vision in the postmodern age now becomes complicated by an ethics 
of blindness (cf. Emmanuel Levinas) and sublimity (cf. Jean-François 
Lyotard). I will explore the implications of this “blind spot” for art 
education by introducing the question of “radical or diabolical evil;” i.e., 
the possibility that the human will is capable not simply of opposing 
the moral law, but making this opposition the very motive of human 
action. Such a possibility, for example, is paradigmatically illustrated by 
Oliver Stone’s film Natural Born Killers which specularizes its excesses 
(Hamsher, Murphy, Townstead, & Stone, 1994). Given the prevalence 
of this “dark God,” what are art educators to make of postmodern evil? 
Part One responds to this question through “five lessons” that are meant 
to lay the ground work for further analysis (i.e., a sequel—Part Two) 
which will extend this conversation to the simulacra world of electronic 
technology and the digitalized image in a more direct manner.1        
Lesson One:  Perception as  (Mis)perception        and 
Deception
There is a famous story told by Pliny about the quest of the 
1This short essay is the beginning of a larger project which explores the 
question of art, art education and ethics from a decidedly Lacanian psychoanalytic 
point of view begun some ten years ago (see jagodzinski, 1996). Part 2, which 
deals with the question of the deep structures of perception and simulacra of 
digitalized images has been developed for “Untold Stories about Perception” 
an art education symposium honoring the work of Ron N. MacGregor. The 
notion of “downcast eyes” in the title comes from Jay (1993).
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artist to represent reality. One day Zeuxis and Parrhasius 
had a painting contest to determine who could best paint 
nature in all its verisimilitude. Zeuxis painted grapes which 
were so lifelike that birds came and began to peck at them. 
Overjoyed, he thought that he had won the “mimetic” prize. 
Parrhasius, on the other hand, had painted a picture of a 
curtain. When Zeuxis came over to see what Parrhasius had 
done, he requested that the curtain be drawn back and the 
picture displayed. When he realized that he been fooled he 
gestured in defeat. Whereas he had managed to deceive only 
birds, Parrhasius had deceived an artist.
This story holds a special place in the development of Western art 
concerning the question of mimesis, or “realism.” The capturing of an 
exact mirror likeness of Nature remains a strong impulse for school-age 
artists and for the “lay” public in general. Adolescents, who their peers 
identify as “class artists,” are often judged by their skillful ability to render 
reality “naturalistically.” Professional artists, especially illustrators, are 
legitimated by their ability to draw “realistically.” Unquestionably, art 
education has sought to teach such drawing skills. Kimon Nicolaïdes 
(1941), whom Betty Edwards (1979) studied, provided sure ways to 
draw “naturally.” Some art educators feel that constant practice is all 
that is necessary. Peter London (1989), for instance, wrote, “Do you 
want to draw like Rembrandt or Degas? Simple! Just draw ten hours 
a day, six days a week, for forty years” (p. 16).
If art is to be “accessible” and not “avant-garde” it seems that there 
has to be some transference of feeling between the viewer and what is 
represented. The gestalts have to be recognizable, but not necessarily 
“realistic.” Like the bird in Pliny’s story it becomes necessary for the 
viewer to “peck” at the art in order to understand its meaning. The 
temporal gap between an image’s effect on spectators and their response 
to it must be instantaneous. The feeling of “surprise” or “delight” that 
characterizes aesthetic experience is suddenly “present,” and seems to 
emerge from “nowhere” (“know/where?”). In contrast, in a film or novel 
we have to wait for the unfolding of the narrative in various scenes (the 
moving tableaux) before the “surprises” begin to happen.
So the first lesson Pliny’s story teaches art educators is that the 
connection between the image and the viewer must be, in some way, 
illusionary. The image, sculpture, film, dramatic play, and so on, must 
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first catch the viewer before  he or she understands its meaning. An 
“arrest” of movement must occur that means that the spectator believes 
in what s/he sees. A suspension of disbelief is a necessary condition for 
art to take its effect on us. The spectator has to be “hailed” by the work 
of art; and an “interpellation” or “suture” of identity with its “world” 
has to transpire (see Althusser, 1971; Silverman, 1983). However, what 
is considered “illusionary” and “realistic” is a question of modality  and 
cultural specificity. Modality, as Hodge and Tripp (1986) have concluded 
from studying children as they watched television, depends upon the 
established cultural codes. In the Western perspectival world children 
find the news more “realistic” or “real” and hence less illusionary than 
television cartoons or spectacular action pictures. The question of 
modality raises the question of the psychic distance between the viewer 
and the aesthetic object. For children, the news has more of a distancing 
effect than the spectacular effects of artistic illusion. When a culture, 
such as Islamic fundamentalism, remains more isolated and protective 
of the electronic “carpentered perspectival world” of spectacularity 
(see Segall et al., 1966), the modality of what is considered “realistic” 
and “illusionary” rests more on oral/aural tradition and written 
orthodoxy.2       
It seems that the trompe-l’oeil effects in Pliny’s story have a strong 
tactile sense about them, a tangibility which hints at the possibility 
that both blindness (invisibility) and seeing (visibility) somehow 
come curiously together. The temporality of sequential perception, a 
characteristic of the way blind people “see,”3  and space, associated with 
“normal” vision, collapse as modalities in the arresting moment. Feel 
and look, acting as one, characterize the fascinum (spell) as distance 
vanishes. Certain sculptures or paintings “invite” touching, so much so 
that the effect of the resultant “peck” becomes a question of transgression 
of distance. Visitors to museums and art galleries must observe “the 
do not touch” policy. The “peck” is considered to be pathological if a 
2With the introduction of the video camera and Super 8 film the grounds of 
what is “realistic” and “illusionary” undergoes another shift as television series 
like Top Cops and The Most Wanted  attempt to provide a “realistic” portrayal of 
crime. In this context “realism” is meant to act as a deterrent against crime (and, 
I would suggest, inciting paranoia) keeping “illusionary” space at a distance. 
This, however, is not the case with computer games where graphics “make-up” 
its artistic artifice. Each generation of computer graphics are said to be more 
“realistic” and “superior” to the ones before on the grounds that the child or 
adolescent can become more embodied in the illusionary world that the game 
provides. Children and adolescence judge their “realism” by the qualitative 
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spectator actually “copy-cats” in “actual” life the aggression, violence, 
rape, or killing seen especially on television and film where the technical 
proficiency of reproducing the “essential copy” of “reality” are at 
their height (see Bryson, 1983). Here the power of the trompe-l’oeil 
effect is said to be so powerful that the “image” (and by implication 
its creator) are held responsible. We need only think of Orsen Well’s 
1940s radio play The War of the Worlds which caused a panic because 
of its illusionary power to create the belief that aliens have landed. In 
such cases art imitates life and life imitates art to the point where the 
boundary between them seems indistinguishable.
It is not difficult to comprehend why modernist Kantian aesthetics, 
which invests “aesthetic attitude” with a particular kind of distance 
characterized by “disinterestedness,” guards against this potential fall 
into “immorality.” The implications of Pliny’s story forms part of Kant’s 
problematic. Kant, a pious Lutheran, in his third and final critique—The 
Critique of Judgement—attempted to bridge the abyss between reason 
(“pure” determinate judgments of science, the realm of necessity, the 
“is”) and ethics (“pure” practical and indeterminate judgments of 
morality, the realm of freedom, the “ought”) through analogies drawn 
from aesthetic exemplars such as parables, allegories, and episodic 
narratives. Some aesthetic objects wereob-scene. Their trompe-l’oeil  effects 
had no redeeming moral values whatsoever. Such art was simply all 
“artifice” and trivial entertainment. Baby boomers of the Moral Right 
blame television violence, punk, gangster rap and heavy metal music 
(played backwards for its satanic messages) for destroying the moral fiber 
of the youth. This familiar complaint stretches back to Plato’s injunction 
amount of distance which vanishes when the game is being played (see also 
Virilio, 1991). Ultimately this leads to the “impossible” fantasy of cyberspace 
where the body has “figuratively” entered into the computer (e.g., as in Walt 
Disney’s film Tron was the earliest example, now we have MUDs and virtual 
communities).  Metaphorically, the bird has not only pecked the grape, but has 
begun to explore all the juices it has to offer! Such a cyber fantasy has a direct 
bearing on the ethical question this essay is attempting to raise for art education. 
Part 2 develops this further. (I would like to thank Karen Keifer-Boyd’s helpful 
commentary in clarifying this difficulty between “realism” and “illusion.”)    
3The story about Virgil, a blind man who regained his sight after having 
cataract operations on both eyes, relates the difficulties of the conflict between 
sequential perception and spatial perception. This dilemma ended up being 
an unresolvable conflict for him. After several years of trying to visually “see,” 
Vigil became psychically blind to end his torment so that he could blindly “see” 
once more. See Sacks’ (1995) chapter “To See or Not to See.” 
122    jagodzinski
against artists for their effects of simulacra. Presumably psychic health 
consists of “good” family value television (a euphemism for television 
programming that is both educationally and morally proper). Listening 
to Pat Boone songs and having a V-chip (a “violence” chip) installed 
in one’s television set will insure psychological health. Teaching and 
consuming the best works of art and literature in the schools will nurture 
“good” upright and caring citizens. Such reasoning  can be traced to 
the most influential educator of the nineteenth century: the British 
school inspector Matthew Arnold (1869). His most recent revivalists in 
higher education are such figures as the late Alan Bloom (1987)., E.D. 
Hirsch, Jr. (1987), Roger Kimball (1990) and Dinesh D’Souza (1991). In 
art education we have Ralph Smith’s (1988) crusade for “excellence” 
and the Discipline Based Art Education (DBAE) curriculum sponsored 
by The Getty Center for Education in the Arts (Feinstein,1988).
Lesson 2: Theologica Moralis: Art and Evil
The deception of the trompe-l’oeil effect obviously both fascinates 
(charms) and threatens, a threat which must be contained. The threat is 
that of an “evil eye,” an “eye” that is capable of arresting movement and 
killing life. In some stories the moment of punishment is the moment 
of looking. We have only to think of the story of Sodom (Genesis, 19) 
where Yahweh turns Lot’s wife into salt for looking back at Yahwah’s 
destruction of the city. The gorgon Medusa in Greek mythology was 
capable of turning men into stone, paralyzing them into terror when 
they gazed at her face. From the Biblical injunction against worshipping 
false idols, to Bernard of Clairvaux’s complaint to Abbot William that 
monks were fascinated by the representations of animals and fabulous 
beasts that flourished on the capitals of Romanesque cathedrals rather 
than studying the text of the Bible (see Jauss, 1982), theological discourse 
has always  supposed the natural  propensity of “man” to be “drawn in,” 
deceived or be fooled by the artist’s trompe-l’oeil  effects. Throughout 
history, iconoclasm is a well-documented phenomenon, perhaps the 
Calvinist and Islamic injunctions against “graven” images of any kind 
are the severest and most puritanical examples. 
From a Biblical point of view the question of the trompe-l’oeil is 
heavily coded by moral injunctions. There is no “good eye” in the Old 
or New Testament (Lacan, 1979, p. 119). It is always maleficient. The 
lust for sex and being caught by the pornographic image underpins 
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the allegory of “man’s” fall from God’s grace. Sex remains demonic. 
Like the bird in Pliny’s story the male uncontrollably “pecks” at the 
female in a “natural” state of hysterical sexual frenzy. It requires little 
theoretical effort to see how the sensuousness of the material body, rather 
than the soul or the mind, is coded as being evil, its lot cast with the 
animal kingdom in its inability to participate in higher transcendental 
realms. The ontology of the medieval “Great Chain of Being” (Lovejoy, 
1978) hierarchically ordered the animals in their possible relation to the 
transcendental spirit of God. Slithering on the bottom was, of course, 
the snake which transports us to the allegory of the Garden of Eden. 
This debased and lowest of creatures, perhaps first associated with 
goddess worship as a symbol of phallic control (e.g., in predynastic 
Egypt a picture of a cobra was the hieroglyph for the word Goddess, 
see Stone, 1976), is evil personified, prompting the woman to use her 
body to lure man into sin which formed the stain that “mared” the 
purity of God’s light by the reddish glow of the apple’s bite. Adam and 
Eve must struggle against Nature in order to survive as Adam and Eve 
are cast out of the illusionary, symbiotic, and fantasmatic relationship 
with God to fend for themselves.
There is yet another aspect to the allegory of the Garden which 
again brings up the question of sight. When Adam and Eve face God 
they do not lack. They seem completely under His watchful eye, an 
originary trompe-l’oeil effect where only His gaze is beneficent. Having 
“sinned,” however, they fall out of His “grace,” and consequently 
must face the “evil” outside the Garden. Now as incomplete creatures 
Adam and Eve must face the “imagos of the[ir] fragmented body” (Lacan, 
1977, p. 11), e.g., 
images of castration, mutilation, dismemberment, 
dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of 
the body. One only has to listen to children aged between 
two and five playing, alone or together, to know that the 
pulling off of the head and the ripping open of the belly 
are themes that occur spontaneously to their imagination, 
and that this is corroborated by the experience of the doll 
torn to pieces.  (ibid.)
Children engage in acts of sadism and masochism—hate and 
pain (e.g., as temper tantrums and crying) when society fails to meet 
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their  needs and demands. They are frustrated by being uncoordinated 
and not “whole.” Emotions of both love (pleasure and the life drive) 
and hate (reality and the death drive) emerge as children struggle to 
preserve and maintain themself.4  As newly born children, Adam and 
Eve possess an ontological aggressiveness. There is a voracious aspect 
of their sight that is marked by “evil.” The eye has consumptive scopic 
desires. To be whole and complete, their eye  (metonymic for the self as 
I) is capable of an “evil look” in its thirst to survive and possess some 
Thing that will make it complete and satisfied. Evil, which is another 
name for the “death-drive” in Freud’s system, is ontologically before 
the Good, and in this sense “radical” (see Zizek, 1993).5  We could say it 
is the “original stain of nature,” that is, the Christian concept, “original 
sin.” By way of evil, “man” wrests himself from animal instinctual 
rhythms, that is, “he” overcomes the dominion of pathological natural 
impulses. In other words it is Evil that enables man to free himself from 
the “nature” which “he” shares with animals. Evil as the death drive 
“installs” the system of pleasure. It makes way for the Good! “Man’s” 
originary choice is not between Good and Evil as oppositions, rather 
it is between the pathology of Being (our animalness) and radical Evil 
(overcoming it).
Lesson 3: The Moment of Blindness as Objet a
What has all this to do with our discussion concerning art 
education? It seems that certain forms of hyperviolence, i.e., in particular 
aestheticized violence which appeals only to ethical indifference and 
consumptive gratitiude, require more than a hysterical reactionary 
response by self-appointed moral guardians of society. The aesthetics 
of specularity in the media and the continued commercialization of the 
arts should give art educators pause to rethink “visual literacy” in this 
postmodernist era. “Visual literacy” involves more than the outdated 
understandings of perception (Rudolf Arnheim for instance). It requires 
a recognition that unconscious fantasy permeates all our conscious 
4Space does not allow me to elaborate on the importance of the “death 
instinct” as a second-order principle which governs, founds, or “installs” the 
pleasure principle which governs our psychic life where we systematically 
seek pleasure and avoid pain. This is brilliantly articulated in comprehensible 
language by Gilles Deleuze in his chapter “The Death Instinct” (1991). 
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life. I have noted that the trompe-l’oeil effect is considered “evil” and a 
threat, as well as a seduction. From the psychoanalytic point of view, 
it shows the subject’s lack of presence because the image’s potential 
to mislead and deceive the eye seemingly happens without mediation 
and modification. The transaction appears “causal,” i.e., as a natural 
and unrestrained response. 
The second part of Pliny’s story, which involves the curtain as 
trompe-l’oeil  presents a different scenario. The eye is “taken in” only 
momentarily. The entire aesthetic effect depends on the eventual 
recognition that the painting is illusionism  rather than illusion, as 
Mitchell (1994) argues. To deceive a human being, as Parrhasios makes 
clear, is to present the spectator with a painting of a curtain or “veil” 
(linteum). What incites Zeuxis is not the veil per se, but what was 
“behind” it—which was precisely nothing! Lacan (1979) reads Pliny’s 
story as an illustration of unconscious “desire.” It was the seduction of 
Zeuxis’ desire that did him in. What attracts and satisfies a spectator in a 
trompe-l’oeil is a moment when, by a mere shift in the gaze, the spectator 
is able to realize that the representation does not move with the gaze, 
but indeed is merely a trompe-l’oeil. The picture does not compete with 
“reality” per se, but with what is beyond appearance. Lacan reads this 
“beyond” as objet petit a—the fascinatory element introduced by the 
gaze—which, in psychoanalytic parlance, is the desire to be complete 
and whole. One’s lack is filled by the fascinatory object. A successful 
work of art that the artist or student either consumes or produces is 
one which satisfies this lack. It provides psychic satisfaction and makes 
one feel more “alive.” It is here that the pedagogical task for the art 
educator becomes difficult, since “visual literacy” in this sense is an art 
education based on this “blind spot” of desire. Let me try to explain 
what is at stake here by returning to the Pliny story. 
Paradoxically, in a painting that has momentarily “caught” the 
5The ontological system that is being questioned here is (again) the mod-
ernist ethic proposed by Kant. Following the work of Slavoj Zizek, Joan Copjec 
and Jean-Luc Nancy (Nancy, 1993) the claim is that Kant was unable to accom-
modate and account for the question of “radical evil” in his system. “Radical 
evil” is the exception that deconstructs his systemic ethics based on reason.
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spectator into its lure (its labyrinth of meaning) there is a blind spot or 
absence present in the central field of the picture. This is what Zeuxis 
does not “see” but desires. It is what he is “blind” to. In other words, 
every representation contains within itself a metaphorical “vanishing 
point” which indicates the limit of the field of vision and consciousness, 
just as there is always a vanishing point on the horizon of our field 
of perception. It is this point, or limit which can be equated with 
Lacan’s notion of objet a. Objet a is what “frames” vision psychically, 
not perceptually. It is removed from the field of visual reality which 
frames it. A slightly modified diagram introduced by Jacques-Alain 
Miller, Lacan’s foremost practitioner, as it appears in Zizek (1992, p. 
94), demonstrates this framing of visual experience.
We see here that objet a frames our psychic Imaginary “vision.” 
Lacan made a distinction between the eye and the gaze. The eye (or the 
look) stands for the geometrical, visual grammar of the current historical 
hyperconventional “realism” (art as mimesis or versimilitude in Pliny’s 
case), and the gaze stands for the subject’s position within this grammar. 
Whereas the eye (look) represents the conscious, self-reflective subject 
of knowledge or cogito, the desiring subject of the gaze leads us to the 
unconscious desire for an unknown object which in Lacanian parlance 
is (once more) objet a. The objet a  is something separate from the subject, 
that which the subject lacks to constitute itself as psychically “whole” 
or complete. Lacan argues that the primordial objet a  of satisfaction is 
the mother’s breast. 
The blind spot (objet a) which appears in the hallucinatory mirror 
after the initial suture into the picture, represents the limitation of 
the subject’s consciousness. Objet a, where Zeuxis’ directed his gaze, 
has no specular image, no visibility, and represents the other side of 
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vision and consciousness. It belongs to the unconscious, and forms the 
“cause” of desire. Recognizing that such desire ensnared him, evoked a 
“smile” (“delight,” “surprise”) from Zeuxis when he realized his own 
expectatins had fooled him. The imagined object of his own desire 
had “framed” him. In other words, his gaze became inverted and 
directed back at himself. Based on the illusion of seeing only a mirror 
of reality (as represented by the veil where there is no blind spot), to 
the moment when he realizes that he and his surprise are the object 
of Parrhasius’ gaze its blind spot has now appeared. The gaze of the 
Other (e.g., Parrhasius) decenters his vision. Zeuxis is no longer the eye 
(“I”) of consciousness seeing what he wants to see. Rather he is seen in 
a way that he may not want to be seen (self-consciously with “egg” on 
his face). His initial illusion was broken when he “downcast” his eyes. 
The “true” nature of envy presents itself in such a gesture. As Lacan 
(1979) remarks, “invidia  [envy] comes from videre,” to see (p. 115). It 
is triggered when someone gazes at someone else who—seemingly— 
possesses objet a, and is, therefore, complete and satisfied, for example, 
when a little child sees his younger brother at his mother’s breast. Envy 
here is not jealousy, nor is it directed at possessing a particular object 
(the child who looks at his younger brother does not want to possess 
the breast). Rather, it is directed at the illusion that someone else is 
whole and complete. In Zeuxis case that Parrhasius might be fullfilled 
by possessing objet a. The lesson Lacan teaches us here is that desire is 
the desire of the Other. 
The curtain or veil is identified by Lacan as a particular kind of 
trompe-l’oeil which he playfully calls a “dompe-regard . . . the taming, 
civilizing, and charming power of the function of the picture” (1979, 
pp. 111; 116). A dompe-regard  evokes “downcasts” eyes. It is, therefore, 
a turn to the “good.” Zeuxis recognizes that he has been “framed.” But 
this “frame” had to preceed his moment of “knowledge” in order to 
“tame” his envious gaze. Zeuxis had to avert his gaze and admit failure. 
By perceiving what was non-perceivable within himself (the blind spot 
as the “nothing” behind the veil), Zeuxis provides an exemplary case for 
the West’s lesson of coming to grips with desire of the Other—an ethical 
act which refers to the interrogation of one’s own response to Things in 
relation to the Other. Animals are not capable of doing although humans 
share with them an Imaginary realm. An oscillation between illusion and 
illusion-ism has to take place if such an ethics is to succeed. The power of 
(  )
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the image has to be continually overcome. The “good” becomes defined 
as the overcoming of deceptive appearances. These could include the 
“lure” of advertising, ideology critique, pornography, and of course, 
exposing the panoptic surveillance of a spectacular society. The paradox 
of the artist in such an ontological position is that s/he must work with 
the arrestment of life and the movement of the self as a way to “ward 
off” the evil eye. Art becomes a moral endeavor. While banning and 
pacifying the evil eye, painting formally relies on its arresting function. 
Both movement  and arrest form the dialectic of painting, as the paradox 
of the constancy of change itself.6  Every work of art must necessarily be 
an act of failure, or, perhaps a momentary victory, in the sense that art 
can never satisfy fully and completely psychic wholeness. One thinks 
here of such industrious artists as Giacometti whose search to find 
the “human essence” after uncountable attempts was, in this sense, a 
failure. Giacometti shows us that there is also the danger of becoming so 
obsessed with a Thing, that the Thing can begin to devour the artist. In 
other words, the artist, like the spectator is no less immune to the threat 
of trompe-l’oeil  which constitutes an undoing of the psychical defenses. 
Such ob-session, like something which is ob-scene, indicates crossing a 
boundary into a perverse and psychotic world (next lesson).
Lesson 4: When the World Stares Back                and 
Objects Possess Us!
In some moments we have what might be properly called psychotic 
experiences, when that which is “normally” invisible to us in our 
everyday perception, reveals itself. These are moments when “objects” 
stare back at us, as if they possessed the gaze. Rather than being in control 
of our own gaze, at moments objet a  appears to peer at us. We may 
have auditory hallucinations. (For example, Norman’s mother’s voice 
in Hitchcock’s Psycho.) These are typically uncanny, unnerving, anxiety 
ridden moments when the unconscious non-perception “speaks.” We 
sometimes experience a flash of the phenomenon when we gaze at 
the mirror but don’t recognize ourselves. The uncanny evokes an odd 
moment of anxiety. There are experiences that make us feel as though 
we are gazed at when no one is there. Art objects, especially films, can 
show us what we don’t want to see by forcing their gaze back upon 
us. In other words, paradoxically, we vanish as subjects when such 
objects “eat” us up as in David Cronenberg’s biography of Edgar Rice 
Bourrough, Naked Lunch (Thomas & Cronenberg, 1991). The presence 
of objet a constitutes the threat—the undoing of a psychical defense—
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causing a split or division within ourselves (written as $, Lacan’s symbol 
for the split-subject of desire). We are suddenly self-exposed when we 
recognize that we are seen “being seen.” Freud (1923/1961) captured 
such dread and horror through his examination of the German word 
Unheimlich  (frightening, eerie, sinister) which is related to Heimlich that 
has the ambivalent meaning of either homely and familiar, or hidden 
and secret. The un of Unheimlich marks the return of repressed material. 
We can say that what is Heimlich belongs to the “look,” visibility, and the 
symbolic order of language, while Unheimlich belongs to the gaze, objet 
a, the imaginary order, and the unconscious. William Blake’s visions 
present a paradigmatic example of such perverse perception. Kandinsky 
(1964) ofters a more “modern” example of such animistic perception 
when he wrote, “Everything ‘dread’ trembled. Not only the stars, moon, 
woods, flowers of which the poets sing, but also the cigarette butt in the 
ashtray . . . everything shows me its face, its innermost being; its secret 
soul, which is more often silent than heard” (pp. 23-24).  
The familiarity (Heimlich) of art which is regulated by intentionality 
and a centered point-of-view, the “eye” or I of consciousness, can act as 
a screen against such moments. When art is familiar it appears harmless 
(less harmful). This explains the strong impulse for realism in the arts 
by young people and adults alike. The (over)emphasis on “beauty” 
and properly distanced realism, represses the fear of the sublime as the 
uncanny “evil” eye, and provides a “normal” perception which centers 
a coherent subject-spectator rather than decenters vision in which the 
“world,” or Big Other, is gazing at you—panoptically and scopophillicly 
(i.e., vouyeristically). Masks, puppets, and ventriloquism, which projects 
the voice “elsewhere,” provide a mediation from this panoptic gaze 
and voice.7  These are forms of a homeopathic or prophylactic “eye” 
which enable us to effectively deal with this potentially psychotic 
“worldly” gaze which exists everywhere and nowhere. Realistic art 
participates in the dompte-regard  as a process of taming and reassuring 
our normal perception. Like masks, realism in representation requires 
that the spectator adopt the stance of the fetishist. Fetishism requires 
that we undertake a simultaneous acceptance and denial of what 
we see. We believe that what is represented reflects the real world, 
yet at the same time, we recognize that the representation is only a 
6Lacan who was a good friend of Merleau-Ponty drew many of his examples 
of art from him and, of course, Surrealists like René Magritte. Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception and his interest in Cézanne were Lacan’s points 
of departure.
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representation. Fetishism in this sense is a psychically “healthy” response 
for “normative” perception. The fetishistic cult object of indigenous 
peoples, such as a talisman, acts as a “counter-eye” to guard against 
evil. In psychoanalytic theory, fetishism, as the binding together of belief 
and knowledge, acts as a defense against castration which signifies to 
the subject his/her own emptiness—that is, the fundamental splitting 
of subjectivity ($) as ideal ego (the look) and ego ideal (the gaze). But 
the trompe-l’oeil can produce an uncanny effect, a hyperbolization of 
positioning the spectator in a situation in whichthere is a separation 
between belief and knowledge. The contradiction between these two 
events becomes more apparent as the gap between the Imaginary and 
the Symbolic registers in the conscious mind. For the trompe-l’oeil to 
“work,” there has to be a “delay” in the knowledge that seems real is 
indeed artifice. The longer the interval between illusion and illusionism 
, the more anxiety, fright, and horror the spectator can feel. This seems 
to be particularly the case within the horror genre.
A disturbing example in this regard is the 1993 Belgium film Man 
Bites Dog , directed and written by three film students: Remy Belvraux, 
Andre Bonzel and Benoit Poetvoorde. Shot in black and white in the 
style of a documentary, it recounts the story of several film students 
who wish to document a psychopathic killer. As the story proceeds they 
become implicated in the killings, and the psychopath eventually kills 
the camera crew. The spectator is never certain whether these events 
were staged or real. The experience is as repulsive as a “snuff” film 
in which a “real” victim is tortured, raped, maimed, shot, and killed. 
There is no “acting” involved. The filmmakers of Man Bites Dog seem 
to have consciously eschewed acting. The disturbance of its effects are 
increased by the sheer “ordinariness” of the actors. No one in the film 
is “recognizable” or famous enough to indicate to the viewer that this 
is all artifice. The moment of illusionism never comes. The spectator 
remains “locked” - trapped - in its illusion, which is a profoundly 
disturbing experience. Such films are “rare.” It is obviously this fear that 
Boomer moralists are reacting against, although they target violence 
indiscriminately, since they are unable to articulate their unease easily. 
7I am not developing aspects of the voice which forms another object a in 
Lacan’s system, the mother’s voice being its originary function. This is merely 
to recognize its power here. See Silverman’s (1992) “Fassbinder and Lacan: A 
reconsideration of gaze, look and image” for an understandable account for 
the gaze in its capacity as society’s Big Other.
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The violence of a film such as Man Bites Dog is “too real”—“too close.” 
When it loses its fetishistic, i.e., its artificial “staged” effect, the eyes 
cannot “blink” and become downcast or averted. Cinema in the moral 
reactionary’s view, ought to act as an institutionalized control of the 
effects of trompe-l’oeil. Art’s dompte-regard  is supposed to teach us the 
moral lessons which surround our desires; to make the invisible visible 
in Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) turn of phase, and to help us perceive the 
imperceptible. This has been the West’s legacy: the triumph of rationality 
over our emotions and passions; the repression of the demons that come 
at us out of the sublime as a way to face the amorality of nature. Pliny’s 
account of the illusion of realism, taken in its broader context (see Mitchell, 
1994), was for the greater progress of the political economy of Athens. 
The public function of “realistic” art, by such artists as Apollodorus, 
Timanthes, Androcydes, Eupompus, Zeuxis and Parrhasius, was its 
role in political propaganda and mass spectacle, as means to propagate 
noble genealogy. But this was not all. Pliny’s recounting of the story 
compared the superiority of humans over animals in their ability to 
overcome the illusions that captured them. Rather than being enslaved 
by the image, Pliny argued that humans could become self-conscious, 
as they become aware that a mere image had “taken them in.” With 
the proper distance such freedom could be achieved from the power of 
illusions that arrested their attention. Interpellation by the image could 
be overcome through criticism, ideology critique and demystification, 
a long standing agenda for educators of the Left.  
Concluding Lesson: The Hidden Binaries
Having justified why art education should continue to both pursue 
the fetishization of objects (as forms of realism) as well as continually 
break the spells of trompe-l’oeil so as to achieve the “right” Kantian 
distance and avoid the pathology of psychosis, there is of course, 
something very “wrong” and troubling with this modernist endeavor. 
I will conclude with a discussion of some of these troubling issues. 
Pliny’s story sets up a self/other binary in which the first hierarchy 
is between animals and humans. Humans can overcome their animal 
nature, animals can not overcome theirs. A strong anthropocentrism 
asserts itself, one which John Berger (1980) identifies as standing for all 
forms of otherness: class, race, sex and gender. Not only have animals 
become throughout history progressively more and more marginalized, 
but race, sex, gender and class are represented by images of subhuman 
brutishness, bestial appetite, and mechanical servility. This is one side of 
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the anthropocentrism which has displaced God with Man at the apex of 
Modernism’s inversion of the “Great Chain of Being.” We must rethink 
the question of nature’s animism from the perspective of an ecological 
consciousness and a green aesthetics (jagodzinski, 1987, 1992). The 
sublime sense of nature is coded as evil both in scientific and theological 
discourse. From this yet another self/other binary reproduces itself as 
the West and the “Rest.” The Western eye presents a division between 
an animistic art which is caught up with vision quests and in which 
one seeks guidance from the spirit world (see Highwater, 1981), and 
a rationalism that represses such “monsters” (not spirits). Do we then 
follow Freud (1923/1961) in his claim that archaic animistic knowledge 
is more “primitive”? that, before the advent of scientific rationalism 
the world was more “psychotic”? and that the West is therefore more 
“progressive”? 
There is yet another self/other binary at work here which is 
every bit as fundamental as the other two, and this is the recognition 
that for the masculine subject, woman is the trompe-l’oeil par excellent. 
First, and perhaps most obviously, is that males have viewed women 
as closer to Nature than they are. She lactates, menstruates, gives birth 
to children, socializes (tames) them, and “services” the body through 
such nurturing actives as cooking the meals and looking after the 
Heim  (house) (see Ortner, 1974). Further, she is the one who wears 
the mask (the masquerade of make-up), which, on the one hand is her 
“lure,” and also a sign that she needs more “protection.” More frail 
and susceptible than her male counterpart (recall the Garden scene) 
she is less rational. Perceptually, according to psychologists like Witkin 
(1949/50), she is said to be more “field dependent” than men who are 
“field independent.” In other words, the lures of the environment ensnare 
her. This view supposes that women are less analytical than men, e.g., 
that they can not read maps, and only tell men drivers “where to go” 
(pun intended). Accordingly, the brain of women is said to be wired 
differently. Psychosexual brain differences put her “spatial imagination” 
at a big disadvantage (see Fausto-Sterling, 1985 for rebuttals). Being 
“field dependent” she is suspect to the trompe-l’oeil  effects and in the 
Imaginary register.8  Although she dwells in the same “house” (Heim) 
as man she is always a threat. Her “mask” (masquerade) can change 
as the “virgin mother” turns into a she-devil by simply applying “too” 
much make-up and changing her looks. This is a familiar cinematic 
trope (e.g., recently played out in Renny Harlin’s film, The Long Kiss 
Goodnight). She can arouse dread and horror as the “phallic Mother.” 
Like Medusa, she can turn a man to stone. Everything that is coded as 
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feminine, as “body,” loses distance and the right moral attitude since 
the masculine and the feminine are “incomplete selves” who are locked 
together by lack and desire.9  The West’s concept of art  privileges the 
spectator as masculine (the distance of knowledge) and the image as 
feminine (the closeness of belief). If we are to believe the controversial 
Paglia (1990) the Western contemplative, conceptual eye of art was born 
in Egypt (p. 50). Since that time the conflict of identity has remained, as 
Nietzche described it, a struggle of a will-to-power between the forces 
of Dionysus and Apollo.1 0 Lacan (1992) in his seminar on ethics in the 
60s developed the concept of the “sinthome” as that which gives the 
subject its ontological consistency. Zizek (1992) writes that the “sinthome 
is a psychotic kernel that can neither be interpreted (as symptom) nor 
‘traversed’ (as fantasy)—what can we do with it, then?” he asks, “Lacan’s 
answer is to identify with the sinthome” (p. 137). Man’s Western Eye 
has been unable to identify with its sublime Other. In other words, its 
inability to face that which it fears most, that which provides it with 
its very identity.
*   *   *
The uncanny (or umheimlich) has become an important 
consideration in postmodern aesthetic because it acts as a challenge to 
representation—to the acquiescence of fetishism per se. It provides the 
potential to make us see the world not as ready-made for our description, 
depiction, and portrayal. Rather it presents it in a constant process 
of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction. The success of 
recent television shows, such as The X Files, Millennium and Dark Skies 
, among young viewers is an indication that they are fascinated with 
the uncertainty of the times. The sublime remains the Other in Kant’s 
aesthetic of beauty. A working through the West’s realistic repression of 
the sublime can downcast the eye in yet another way. When it can not 
bear to look—but must face its own evil—art tavels upon a road that is 
perhaps too dangerous for the classroom (and Hollywood) because of 
the clanging heard by moral Boomers outside classroom doors. Disney 
Productions seems driven to satiate the Western eye until it becomes 
ob-ese, dripping with mawkish sentimentality. Certainly opening up 
Pandora’s Box to explore repressed perversities provides little economic 
rewards when compared with the reproductive, consumptive hegemony 
of realism and its presumption of an innocent, transparent image. 
What I have in mind can be illustrated by a scene and a film by two 
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director-explorers of the postmodern sublime—the two David’s—Lynch 
and Cronenberg—one American, the other Canadian. Both investigate 
the repressed image and interrogate it rather than preserve it. Radical 
evil is pushed to the point where it reverses itself into moral revelation. 
David Lynch in Wild At Heat presents a rape fantasy so “close” to the 
surface that it answers to the patriarchal “she made me do it” by making 
the scene/seen so painful to watch that the audience is left squirming in 
their seats1 1 (Montgomery & Lynch, 1990). In a lonely run-down motel 
room in the middle of nowhere, William Defoe asserts unrelenting 
pressure on Laura Dern to yield to his desires. He touches and squeezes 
her, invading her space of intimacy and says “fuck me, fuck me” over 
and over again. The ugly scene drags on to the point where we see Dern 
slowly surrendering to his suggestions. The camera pans to her clenched 
hand which slowly opens up in compliance as she faintly answers “yes.” 
The audience is released from any more pain when Defoe makes an 
about face and says, “No thanks. Not today. I’ve to go.” What makes 
the scene/seen so excruciating and excessively cruel is the realization 
that Dern has been psychically and not physically raped. Her secret 
desire to be brutally raped, the very kernel of her being, has been stirred 
up, and exposed. This makes the rape excessively humiliating, and, in 
turn, stretches the gap of illusion to a point where the audience can no 
longer bear to watch the exposure of Dern’s secret. 
On the same register of the sublime, is David Cronenberg’s recent 
8It should be pointed out that there is the object relations theory of 
feminist psychoanalysis like Nancy Chodrow (1978) and an entire movement 
of feminist gynocriticism (predominately lesbian) in literature and art which 
supports such an assumption (see Frueh, Langer, & Raven, 1994). In this view 
the essence of femininity and hence woman is to be found in the imaginary 
pre-Oedipal register where daughters are still attached to their mothers. From 
a Lacanian feminist position, e.g., Constance Penley, Jacqueline Rose, Ellie 
Ragland-Sullivan such essentialism oversimplifies the Oedipal difficulties 
which sex/gender present.
9Here I wish to avoid setting up a hetero/homo binary. Following Lacan’s 
logic in his ‘formulae of sexuation’ (1982) masculine and feminine represent 
‘logical’ positions. A gay or lesbian couple, like a hetero couple, are split into 
masculine and feminine positions.
10More radical feminists like Mary Daly (1978) claim that this opposition 
does not go far enough. Dionysus and Apollo are “two faces of the same god” 
(p.64). She claims that Dionysus is Zeus in his young form. “Dionysus was in 
fact his own father” (ibid.).
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movie Crash, based on J. G. Ballard’s novel about sex and car crashes 
(Thomas, Lantos, & Cronenberg, 1996). The viewer can comprehend the 
movie when one recognizes that the characters in the story are already 
“dead.” Pleasure turned into pain can only be understood by making the 
death-drive present. These characters stare evil in the face, and we are 
asked to stare with them—if we can. The images are far from alluring 
and erotic. Sex is presented in a desexualized fashion—as a drive (Trieb), 
as a need or a demand that is not caught up in the dialectics of desire. 
Sex and metal come together, even more debased and void of spirit 
than any animal. Hard. Cold. Voices show no emotion. Their bodies are 
wedded to metal prosthetically, sometimes to the car itself. They present 
the antithesis of transnational capitalist fantasy of cyberspace as the 
disappearance of the body and the cyborgs it breeds. This is the pain of 
technology gone awry, in which the car crashes of Jayne Mansfield and 
James Dean are revered as heroic and iconic exemplars of the suicidal 
road kill of 50s America (mis)perceived Other—Hollywood’s leading 
ladies and delinquent youth. The reply to the current Boomer nostalgia 
should be obvious. 
On that happy note, I appropriately end this essay on the 31st of 
October, 1996. Halloween. Trick or Treat?  
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